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The Curious Relationship of Marriage and Freedom
Katherine Franke†

Marriage is surely at a crossroad, as the chapters in this
volume so richly attest. In fact, marriage may be at more than one
crossroad, some pointing toward new, uncharted terrain, while
others amounting to intersections we have visited before. My
principal interest in exploring this dynamic moment in the
evolution of the institution of marriage is to better understand why
and how today’s marriage equality movement for same-sex
couples might benefit from lessons learned by African Americans
when they too were allowed to marry for the first time in the
immediate post-Civil War era. I find it curious that the right to
marry, rather than say, employment rights, educational opportunity
or political participation, has emerged as the preeminent vehicle by
and through which the freedom, equality and dignity of gay men
and lesbians is being fought in the present moment.
Why
marriage? In what ways are the values, aspirations, and even
identity of an oppressed community shaped when they are
articulated in and through the institution of marriage? What kind
of freedom and what kind of equality does the capacity to marry
bring forth?
I write this chapter just as same-sex couples have won the
right to legally marry in the state of New York. While there is
much to celebrate in this victory, I am concerned that this new
form of legal recognition for some members of the lesbian and gay
community may come at a cost of rendering more marginalized
and vulnerable other forms of family, kinship, and care (Franke
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2011). Now that same-sex couples can marry, many employers
have announced that they must do so in order to retain benefits to
which they had previously been entitled without the legal sanction
of the state (Bernard 2011) “We can now treat you just as we treat
heterosexual couples,” they say. “Heterosexuals must marry to
gain benefits for their spouses and children, you must now as
well.”
In important ways, what we are witnessing today with
same-sex couples echoes the experience of another group of new
rights-holders almost 150 years ago. To better understand how the
gay rights movement today has collapsed into a marriage rights
movement, and what the costs of such a strategy might be, I will
look backward in history to another time when marriage rights
intersected with the rights of freedom, equality and dignity of a
marginalized population: newly emancipated Black people in the
mid-nineteenth century. The experiences of formerly enslaved
people in the 1860s with newly won rights to marry hold lessons
for the gay rights/marriage movement today.
Since the birth of the same-sex marriage movement,
advocates have argued that if miscegenation laws (laws prohibiting
inter-racial marriage) were an unconstitutional form of race
discrimination, then laws prohibiting same-sex marriage should
amount to unconstitutional sex discrimination. Andrew Koppelman
(1998) has made this argument earliest and most often. Indeed, this
reasoning formed the basis of the first victory for the same-sex
marriage movement in 1999 (Baehr, 1996) when the Supreme
Court of Hawaii found that same-sex couples should have the same
marriage rights as different sex couples.
This analogy never sat well with me. I have long felt that
before the gay and lesbian community committed to a civil rights
strategy based on “if-they’ve-got-it-we-want-it,” we ought to
undertake a little better due diligence about what “they” have
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before “we” insist on getting it too. Don’t get me wrong, I am the
first to admit that what motivates most opponents of same-sex
marriage is a hatred or intolerance of gay and lesbian people,
otherwise known as homophobia. So too, I understand that many
gay and lesbian couples want to get married. Who can deny the
pull of an institution that is so religiously, socially, legally and
financially privileged, particularly as compared with the
alternatives? Even as domestic partnership and civil union laws
increasingly equalize the financial and legal benefits that same-sex
couples can get in lieu of marriage, they can’t match the respect,
dignity and social meanings of being married full stop.
While I recognize why marriage matters so much to some
members of the gay and lesbian community, I would have
preferred if we, as a community, had paused before we invested so
heavily in a politics of recognition, that is, in the blessing that the
state can confer on relationships that meet its requirements for
legitimacy. A recognition-based project of this sort provides few
tools with which to transform or render more just the fundamental
underlying norms by which some forms of life are valued more
highly than others. As Judith Butler (2009) has observed in another
context: “The problem is not merely how to include more people
within existing norms, but to consider how existing norms allocate
recognition differentially. What new norms are possible, and how
are they wrought? What might be done to produce a more
egalitarian set of conditions for recognizability?” (Butler, 2009, p.
6).
It strikes me that in the present moment we could learn
something from the struggle for racial justice, not by analogizing
today’s marriage movement to the fight against miscegenation
laws, but by looking at what happened last time a previously
reviled and disadvantaged group won the right to marry for the
first time. That’s what leads me to look into the immediate post
Civil War regulation of freed peoples’ marriages. I suspected that
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that period might hold out some cautionary tales for us today. And
indeed it does.
Even as I urge this analogy, I won’t argue that the racism
experienced by the freedmen was the same as the homophobia or
heterosexism gay and lesbian people experience today. Nor could
I even suggest that the institution of marriage is the same now as it
was then. That said, I think we can learn from the comparison of
what it means to elaborate a new conception of freedom and
equality through a form of state licensure. Like same-sex couples
today, the freed men and women experienced moving from
outlaws to inlaws, from living outside the law to finding their
private lives organized in both wonderful and perilous ways by and
within law. Being subject to legal regulation is always something
to think carefully about. The experiences of the freedmen suggest
some caution with respect to whether, and if so how, rights – and
specifically a right to marriage – will set you free. Of course rights
are something we cannot not want. But our desire for rights is
something we should indulge with an awareness that they come at
a cost.
In what follows I’ll highlight three principal concerns I
have about the moral hazards associated with a civil rights struggle
that prioritizes marriage rights. Each of these concerns – marriage
as a civilizing institution, the potential collapse of the right to
marry into an obligation to do so, and the disciplinary effects of
marriage meted out through criminal enforcement of adultery laws
– was borne out in the experiences of newly emancipated former
slaves when they won the right to marry in the 19th century, and is
in play in the contemporary same-sex marriage movement.
***
As early as 1774, enslaved people identified the inhumanity
of slavery as lying, in significant part, in the inability to marry. In
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a petition to the new government of Massachusetts a group of
enslaved men wrote: “[W]e are deprived of every thing that hath a
tendency to make life even tolerable, the endearing ties of husband
and wife we are strangers to for we are no longer man and wife
than our masters or mistresses thinkes proper marred or onmarred.”
(Davis, 1997, p. 109). Abolitionist Angelina Grimké (1837) argued
that both positive and natural legal principles required that the
United States “[n]o longer deny [African Americans] the right of
marriage, but let every man have his own wife, and let every
woman have her own husband.” (Hawkins,1972, pp. 61-63;
Richards 1998). In 1850, Henry Bibb, an enslaved man, observed:
“I presume that there are no class of people in the United States
who so highly appreciate the legality of marriage as those persons
who have been held and treated as property.” (Bibb, 1850).
Arguing in favor of the 1866 Civil Rights Act, Illinois Senator
Lyman Trumbull specifically identified the right to marry as a
necessary aspect of citizenship. (Protection of Civil Rights, 1866).
Echoing contemporary arguments in favor of same-sex
marriage, the right to marry figured prominently in the bundle of
rights understood to have been denied to enslaved people, and was
considered necessary to any robust conception of liberty. (Davis
1997; Foner 1988; Grossberg 1985; Gutman, 1979; Malone 1992).
Marriage “provided a way to establish the integrity of their
relationships, to bring a new security to their family lives, and, to
affirm their freedom . . . If the prohibition on marriage had
underscored their dependent position and the precariousness of
their family ties in slavery, the act of marriage now symbolized the
rejection of their slave status.” (Edwards 1996, p. 101 ). Formerly
enslaved people and abolitionists generally deemed the right to
marry one of the most important ramifications of emancipation.
In countless ways, the role of marriage as part of what it
meant for newly emancipated people to be free parallels the
struggles of lesbian and gay people today. Then as now the
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inability to marry inflicted a stinging badge of inferiority on
couples whose love, care and interdependence otherwise mirrored
that of the couples who could legally marry. In important ways for
both groups, the incapacity to marry produced and reinforced their
identity as a lower caste, and the struggle to win marriage rights
figured at the top of the civil rights agenda to expand their equality
and freedom as full citizens in modern society.
That said, the prominence of marriage as the lever by
which both formerly enslaved people and lesbian and gay people
might be elevated from their subordinate status has entailed
noteworthy hazards that are worthy of better understanding.
Marriage, then as now, has been a curious and complicated vehicle
through which to address the injustice of racism and homophobia.
MARRIAGE HAS ITS OWN AGENDA
Unlike other fora that have provided the setting for
important civil rights struggles, such as lunch counters or public
transportation, marriage is a particularly value-laden institution
within which to lodge claims for full citizenship. The same might
be said of military service and even equal educational opportunity.
But for present purposes, when claims for full citizenship are
articulated though a demand for marriage rights, the
disenfranchised group’s interest in equality and freedom must
contend with the values of dignity, discipline, respectability and
security which are entailed in the institution of marriage itself.
Surely, exclusion from the institution of marriage inflicts a
subordinating harm on those excluded. Yet a demand that the
exclusion be lifted in the name of equality and freedom must take
account of the fact that marriage has its own, well-entrenched
agenda.
The role of marriage in the lives of formerly enslaved
people in the 1860s illustrates just what it means to elaborate a
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notion of freedom through the values and commitments of
marriage.
In its reports to the Secretary of War in the early 1860s, the
American Freedmen’s Inquiry Commission reflected the view
dominant among whites at the time that Black people were
uncivilized, degraded, undisciplined, and lived in wholly
unchristian ways, and that the rule of law as well as patient
guidance from whites would tame and civilize them. Thus the
Commission observed that “[t]he law, in the shape of military rule,
takes for him the place of his master, with this difference – that he
submits to it more heartily and cheerfully, without any sense of
degradation.” (American Freedmen’s Inquiry Commission, 1863).
Urging an active role for the federal government in the moral
cultivation of Black character, the Commission's Final Report
concluded on an optimistic note: “[T]hey will learn much and gain
much from us. They will gain in force of character, in mental
cultivation, in self-reliance, in enterprise, in breadth of views and
habits of generalization. Our influence over them, if we treat them
well, will be powerful for good.” (American Freedmen’s Inquiry
Commission, 1864). In support of this claim, the Commission
referred to a Canadian high school principal who maintained that
proximity to whites could even “whiten” Black people's
“unattractive” physical features: “[c]olored people brought up
among whites look better than others. Their rougher, harsher
features disappear. I think that colored children brought up among
white people look better than their parents.” (American
Freedmen’s Inquiry Commission 1864).
Thus, federal officials acted as the guardians of the moral
practices of Black people in order to qualify them for freedom and
citizenship. The enforcement of marriage laws was widely
regarded as the best tool to accomplish these ends. As Michael
Grossberg (1985) notes,
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[a]lthough their response to most black demands for legal
rights was negative, southern whites readily granted the
matrimonial request of their former charges.
The
prevailing belief that marriage civilized and controlled the
brutish nature of all people encouraged the use of formal
matrimony as a remedy for the widespread immorality and
promiscuity that whites believed to prevail among blacks.
(Grossberg 1985, p. 133).
Much of the rhetoric of the time related to the need to civilize the
freed men and women. Herbert Gutman summarized these beliefs
as follows: “As slaves, after all, their marriages had not been
sanctioned by the civil law and therefore ‘the sexual passion’ went
unrestrained.” White officials informed the freed people that “[t]he
loose ideas which have prevailed among you on this subject must
cease,” (Edwards, 1996, p. 93),1 and that “no race of mankind can
be expected to become exalted in the scale of humanity, whose
sexes, without any binding obligation, cohabit promiscuously
together.” (Edwards, 1996, p. 93).2
Many African American people were acutely aware of the
symbolic role that marriage played in the transformation of their
status from slave to citizen. Northern Black elites were often as
judgmental as whites when it came to the practices of poor Blacks.
Laura Edwards (1997) notes that
[m]any African-American leaders were quite aware
that white northerners and southerners alike used
marriage as a barometer of their people’s fitness for
freedom, and they urged poor blacks to adopt the
domestic patterns common among elite whites.
This, they argued, would help convince the nation
that ex-slaves deserved the rights and privileges of
freedom. (Edwards 1997, p. 56).
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In support of this effort, one African American leader, James H.
Harris, argued, “[L]et us do nothing to re-kindle the slumbering
fires of prejudice between the two races. Remember, we are on
trial before the tribunal of the nation and of the world, that it may
be known . . . whether we are worthy to be a free, self-governing
people.” (Edwards 1997, p. 56).3
As such, the work of transforming formerly enslaved
people into citizens may not have been left to the state alone. The
task of discipline and punishment for those who kept up the old
ways was taken up by Black people themselves. Dan Johnson, it
appears, did not consider marrying the woman with whom he had
lived for many years until he sought to become a member of the St.
John's Lodge of Odd Fellows in 1868. After his death, his widow
applied for a war widow’s pension, and one witness testified that
“they were living together in adultery at the time he petitioned to
become a member . . . . [T]he Lodge would not let him join until
he married.” (Pension File of Dan Johnson, 15).
Colored newspapers also played a role in encouraging
African American people to understand their responsibilities
relative to the marriage relation. The Savannah Tribune, formerly
The Colored Tribune, printed an editorial in November 1876
strongly counseling Black women against “Marrying in Haste”:
Do not place yourself habitually in the society of
any suitor until you have decided the question of
marriage; human wills are weak, and people often
become bewildered and do not know their error
until it is too late . . . . A promise may be made in a
moment of sympathy, or even half delirious ecstasy,
which must be redeemed through years of sorrow
and pain. (“Marrying in haste,” p. 4).
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In like fashion, the Semi-Weekly Louisianan cautioned its readers
to consider the sanctity and magnitude of the marital obligation so
as to avoid a wedding being a “sudden and unconsidered thing –
the freak or the passion of an excited hour.” (“Hasty marriages and
divorces,” p. 1).
These examples show that by the mid-1870s some African
Americans were performing within and serving Victorian cultural
institutions, at once evidencing their own successful domestication
and regulating those who did not conform to larger cultural norms
relating to sex, gender, and sexuality. For some, conformity to
these norms was a price paid instrumentally for the respect they
believed it would buy. For others, no doubt, this was what it meant
to be a freed, if not free, person. Freedom and citizenship entailed
a wide range of self-discipline.
Do we have reason to worry that marriage will operate as a
civilizing institution for lesbians and gay men today as it did for
newly emancipated people in the nineteenth century? Are the
Victorian values that structured marriage rights then no longer with
us today? Well, there may be some reason for concern today as
same-sex couples make the case that they have a right to marry.
After the devastating loss that was the Supreme Court’s Bowers v.
Hardwick decision in 1986, the lesbian and gay community
understood that it had work to do. It had not made itself
recognizable to the public and to legal authorities as a community
worthy of full constitutional protection and the dignity that
recognition would confer.
So that work began. On school boards, on little league
fields, at PTA meetings, in churches, workplaces, grocery stores –
everywhere. Lesbians and gay men set out to demonstrate in fora
both quotidian and extraordinary that they were not a perverse
Other, but rather that they were respectable citizens, that they were
just like everyone else. It is important to understand the turn this
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work took. The project was not one of sexual liberation, as had
been the approach of the early Stonewall activists, of “live and let
live,” or “keep your laws off our bodies.” This was not a politics
of neutrality or sexual liberty, nor did it echo the kind of liberal
arguments made by H.L.A. Hart in his debates with Lord Patrick
Devlin about the legitimacy of criminalizing sodomy.4 Rather the
gay politics of the 1990s took a decidedly normative turn in favor
of demonstrating to a skeptical American public that gay men and
lesbians were normal, respectable, and responsible citizens, not the
perverts that Chief Justice Burger had described in Bowers. In
short, the shame of Bowers was met with a politics of redemption.
This work paid off in the Supreme Court’s reversal of
Bowers in the Lawrence v. Texas decision wherein Justice
Kennedy, writing for a slim majority, wrote that the Texas sodomy
statute “demeans the lives of homosexual persons,” they “are
entitled to respect for their private lives. The State cannot demean
their existence or control their destiny by making their private
sexual conduct a crime.” (Lawrence v. Texas 2003, p. 578) He
then repeated soaring language that had been used in an earlier
abortion rights case: “At the heart of liberty is the right to define
one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and
of the mystery of human life.”5 The moralizing of Bowers that left
a homosexual minority vulnerable to the disgust and judgment of
the majority was not replaced in Lawrence with a rule respecting
sexual freedom or even sexual orientation-based equality, but
rather Justice Kennedy gave the boot to the Bowers’ Court’s strong
negative moral visions by substituting his own moral reasoning
grounded in an almost spiritual reverence for the dignity of the
human and a call that the law respect the most intimate choices
each person makes about the meaning of their lives.
This turn to morality, respectability and the dignity of the
person as the core value that now animates gay rights litigation set
the stage for the marriage cases to come.
Perry v.
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Schwarzenegger, the case challenging the California proposition
that amended the state’s constitution to limit marriage to one man
and one woman (Proposition 8) perhaps best illustrates the degree
to which gay men and lesbians’ right to marry is now being
articulated through the values and vernacular of interests that
marriage holds dear, more so than the values that the gay
community has traditionally treasured, such as sexual liberty,
diversity, autonomy and freedom. The testimony by the four
plaintiffs in the Proposition 8 trial, two men and two women,
focused primarily on their desire for respectability, their longing
for the sacred blessing and societal recognition that marriage
confers, on the fact that being married would be better for raising
children, and finally on the disgrace of exile from the sacred
domain of marriage. On top of that, they argued that the state
should play a vital role in promoting the institution of marriage and
that including same-sex couples in the institution would be good
for marriage more generally.
When asked by Ted Olson, one the of the gay couples’
lawyers: “Have you encountered instances where because you are
not married you were placed in embarrassing or awkward
situations?”, Jeff Zarrillo, one of the plaintiffs, testified: “One
example is when Paul and I travel, it's always an awkward
situation at the front desk at the hotel. The individual working at
the desk will look at us with a perplexed look on his face and say,
“You ordered a king-size bed. Is that really what you want?” Or
“It is always an awkward situation walking to the bank and saying,
“My partner and I want to open a joint bank account,” hearing, you
know, "Is it a business account? It would be a lot easier to be able
to say: “My husband and I are here to check into a room. My
husband and I are here to open a bank account.” (Zarrillo
Testimony, p. 84)
When asked by Mr. Olsen about why they haven’t had
children, Mr. Zarrillo said: “Paul and I believe that in order to have
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children it would be important for us to be married. It would make
it easier for -- for us, for our children, to explain our relationship,
for our children to be able to explain our relationship.” (Zarrillo
Testimony, pp. 81-82)
Mr. Olsen then asked Mr. Zarrillo why he and his partner
were not domestic partners – the California domestic partnership
law confers on same-sex couples all of the legal and economic
benefits of marriage, just under a different legal name. Zarrillo
answered: “we hold marriage in such high regard … Domestic
partnership would not give due respect to the relationship that we
have had for almost nine years. Only a marriage could do that.”
(Zarrillo Testimony pp. 82-83)
That the values that motivate much of today’s same-sex
marriage movement share common ground with the efforts to
secure marriage rights for newly freed people in the 19th century is
perhaps no better illustrated than by a short piece Ted Olson wrote
to explain why he was joining the Proposition 8 challenge as cocounsel with David Boies. In “The Conservative Case for Gay
Marriage” Olson wrote:
Many of my fellow conservatives have an almost knee-jerk
hostility toward gay marriage. This does not make sense,
because same-sex unions promote the values conservatives
prize. Marriage is one of the basic building blocks of our
neighborhoods and our nation. At its best, it is a stable
bond between two individuals who work to create a loving
household and a social and economic partnership. We
encourage couples to marry because the commitments they
make to one another provide benefits not only to
themselves but also to their families and communities.
Marriage requires thinking beyond one's own needs. It
transforms two individuals into a union based on shared
aspirations, and in doing so establishes a formal investment
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in the well-being of society. The fact that individuals who
happen to be gay want to share in this vital social
institution is evidence that conservative ideals enjoy
widespread acceptance. Conservatives should celebrate
this, rather than lament it. (Olson, 2010).
In important ways the success of today’s marriage-rights
movement is premised upon a promise of disciple, respectability,
and obeisance to a set of civilizing norms that portray those who
fall short of those norms as an embarrassment, or worse,
undeserving of the full and equal blessings of civic belonging.
The African American community has paid dearly for the “failure”
of many of its members to form respectable families, the
Moynihan Report being only one salient example thereof. (U.S.
Department of Labor, 1965). I worry that we will witness an
increasing divide in the gay community as well: between those
who bend their lives toward marriage’s expectations and are
rewarded therefore, and those who do not or cannot and suffer a
price as a result.
A RIGHT TO MARRY COLLAPSING INTO AN OBLIGATION TO DO SO
Without question the right to marry figured prominently in
the minds of newly emancipated Black people in the U.S. South as
they imagined what it meant to be free. The ability to order their
private lives with spouses of their own choice, and to protect their
families from the wrenching separation created by their sale and
other forms of exploitation by hostile outsiders was among the first
aspects of freedom on which the freed people insisted. As such,
the right to marry not only signaled the new capacity of Black
people to enter into civil contracts which were binding upon
themselves and others, but it also held out a form of security which
newly freed people imagined would erect legal pickets around their
families to protect them from the malevolent interference of white
people.
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Many freed people naively thought that the freedom to
marry meant a freedom to marry according to their own rules and
customs and in family formations of their own choosing free from
white interference. (Franke, 1999). What they quickly found,
however, was that with this new right the freedom to marry
collapsed in short order into an obligation to do so according to an
inflexible definition set out in existing laws. For some time prior
to the establishment of the Freedmen's Bureau in 1865, federal
officers played a significant role in the promotion of marriage
among Black people. In 1862, John Eaton was appointed by
General Grant to set up what were termed “contraband camps,”
settlements that housed Black fugitives in Tennessee and northern
Mississippi. In April 1863, Eaton reported that “all entering our
camps who have been living or desire to live together as husband
and wife are required to be married in the proper manner . . . This
regulation has done much to promote the good order of the camp.”
(Eaton, 1863, pp. 89-90). In March 1864, the Secretary of War
made Eaton's regulation official United States policy, and ordered
Freedmen's Bureau agents to “solemnize the rite of marriage
among Freedmen.” (Order from Edwin Stanton 1864; Gutman
1979). Thereafter, superintendents of the contraband camps
uniformly observed that “the introduction of the rite of Christian
marriage and requiring its strict observance, exerted a most
wholesome influence upon the order of the camps and the conduct
of the people.” (Report by Chaplain Warren, 1864). Recall that the
people seeking entrance to these camps, which today we would
call refugee camps, were in many cases suffering from starvation,
illness, and the other effects of abuse by their “owners.” That the
officers administering the camps saw the ennobling influence of
marriage as the most pressing need of the immiserated fleeing
slaves is quite remarkable.
After emancipation, formerly enslaved people traveled
great distances and endured enormous hardships in order to reunite
families that had been separated under slavery. Shortly after the
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end of the war, southern states acted quickly to amend their
constitutions or enact statutes validating marriages begun under
slavery. Laws that simply legitimized slave marriages if the
couple were cohabiting as husband and wife when the law went
into effect were quite common. Mississippi's 1865 civil rights law
was typical: “All freedmen, free negroes and mulattoes, who do
now and have heretofore lived and cohabited together as husband
and wife shall be taken and held in law as legally married.” (Civil
Rights Act of Nov. 25, 1865, Ch. 4, § 2, 1865 Miss. Laws 82, 82.)6
Some states took a different approach to the marriage of
former slaves, giving “all colored inhabitants of this State claiming
to be living together in the relation of husband and wife . . . and
who shall mutually desire to continue in that relation,” nine months
to formally re-marry one another before a minister or civil
authority. (Act of Jan. 11, 1866, 31). These laws further required
newly married couples to file a marriage license with the county
circuit court, a bureaucratic detail that carried a prohibitively high
price for many freed people. In every state with such laws, failure
to comply with these requirements while continuing to cohabit
would render the offenders subject to criminal prosecution for
adultery and fornication. North Carolina gave the freed people just
under six months to register their marriages with the county clerk.
Each month they failed to do so constituted a distinct and
separately prosecutable criminal offense.
While many formerly enslaved people merely allowed the
law to operate upon them, automatically legitimizing their
marriages, others “swamped public officials with demands to
validate old and new unions.” (Grossberg 1985, p. 134). Mass
wedding ceremonies in the postwar South sometimes involved
seventy couples; in seventeen North Carolina counties in 1866,
9000 marriages were registered (Litwak, 1979) Thus, the right to
marry for African Americans in the immediate postbellum period
had both symbolic and practical significance--symbolic in the
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sense that enjoyment of the right signaled acceptance into the
moral community of civil society, and practical to the extent that
social and economic benefits flowed from being legally married.
However, the right to marry was not merely an
unconstrained liberty enjoyed by African Americans independent
of state interest or control. Even prior to the end of the war, state
and federal officials played an active role in impressing upon
Black people the responsibilities, rather than the rights, that
marriage imposed.
After emancipation, when formerly enslaved people
struggled to reunify relationships shattered by slavery, the first
husband might reappear and expect his wife to live with him as his
spouse. So too, many women had had children with more than one
man and, after emancipation, sought to unify these complex family
formations.
Thus, many formerly enslaved people found
themselves with two or more spouses and with complex, blended
families at the end of the war (Gutman 1979).7 Given that bigamy
was a crime in every state, persons with multiple spouses were
forced to choose one and only one legal spouse and to cease
intimate relations and/or cohabitation with others (Bernard 1996,
pp. 10-11). Georgia's 1866 law relating to “Persons of Color” set
forth the following: [P]ersons of color, now living together as
husband and wife, are hereby declared to sustain that legal relation
to each other, unless a man shall have two or more reputed wives,
or a woman two or more reputed husbands. In such an event, the
man, immediately after the passage of this Act by the General
Assembly, shall select one of his reputed wives, with her consent;
or the woman one of her reputed husbands, with his consent; and
the ceremony of marriage between these two shall be performed
(1866 Ga. Laws 239, 240). The statute then instructed that persons
who fail or refuse to comply with these requirements were to be
prosecuted for fornication, adultery, or both. South Carolina
imposed a similar statutory duty of election. (1865 S.C. Acts 291,
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292). Even though some state laws were silent on the question of
multiple spouses, state and federal officials forced freed men and
women to choose one and only one spouse as a matter of practice.
In some cases where a freed man or woman was unwilling or
unable to choose, Bureau agents felt free to do so for them. An
agent in North Carolina reported that “[w]henever a negro appears
before me with two or three wives who have equal claim upon him
. . . I marry him to the woman who had the greatest number of
helpless children who otherwise would become a charge on the
Bureau”(Litwack 1979, p. 242; Gutman 1979).
The manner in which newly emancipated Black people in
the United States managed the right to marry offers several lessons
for today with respect to the risk that a right to marry can collapse
into an obligation to do so for lesbians and gay men. Just as newly
freed people expected that the right to marry would include a
recognition of the complex families they had formed outside of
legal marriage, so too lesbian and gay people have been surprised
to discover the ways in which winning the right to marry has
diminished the rights they had enjoyed as domestic partners, cohabitating partners, or in other non-marital family forms.
Consider the following:
When the state of Connecticut amended its marriage law in
2009 to allow same-sex couples to marry, the law automatically
married all of the same-sex couples who had entered into civil
unions in Connecticut or in neighboring states, such as Vermont,
without providing those couples adequate notice or giving them an
option to remain in a civil union (Public Act No. 09-13 Sec. 12(a),
2009). While this provision of the new law was likely intended to
be a benevolent blessing on same-sex couples by conferring full
marital status upon those couples who had entered into civil unions
during a period when they could not marry, it presumed i) that civil
unions are an inferior civil marital status, and ii) that all of the
couples in civil unions wanted to be married, It seemed
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unthinkable to the drafters of the Connecticut marriage equality
law that some couples might prefer a civil union over a marriage.
Thus, in some cases, same-sex couples have found themselves to
be automatically married in circumstances very similar to that of
freed people in the nineteenth century. As a woman recently wrote
me in response to an Op-ed I had published in the New York
Times (Franke 2011):
“I purposely did NOT get a civil union in
Connecticut when they recognized civil unions, and didn’t
even know that my Vermont civil union turned into a
marriage when Connecticut then recognized those civil
unions as marriages. The VT CU was largely to support
the general movement. I knew it expressly did not mean
anything in Connecticut. I find myself in the unfortunate
and unanticipated position of going through divorce
proceedings having never been married.”
These sentiments, written by a well-educated woman in 2011,
echo the incredulity expressed by freed men and women who
had no idea that they had to follow formal divorce proceedings
to dissolve their marriages after they had been automatically
married by operation of law.
What is more, same-sex couples are finding that they must
marry in order to retain rights they had previously enjoyed without
being married, such as employment-related health insurance
coverage for one’s partner. Immediately on the heels of the New
York State legislature amending the state’s marriage law to include
same-sex couples several large employers announced that their gay
and lesbian employees would have to marry to continue coverage
for their partners. Never mind that New York City has a domestic
partnership law (which covers both same and different sex
couples) and that many public and private employers had deemed
domestic partnership registration a sufficient bureaucratic filter for
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benefits eligibility. Here, as in other ways, the right to marry has
rendered alternatives to marriage less viable and less secure. A
right to marry has collapsed into an obligation to do so.
DISCIPLINARY EFFECTS OF MARRIAGE, REAL AND ANTICIPATED
Marriage laws provide a form of economic and legal
security for those who qualify, but they also include a set of
expectations that are enforced through both civil and criminal laws.
Exclusivity, sexual fidelity, and duties of support are some of the
most important, but not the only, rules of marriage that ones
spouse and public prosecutors are empowered to enforce. Newly
freed people learned quickly that the right to marry brought with it
the risk of severe sanction in the event that marriages rules were
not followed. Indeed, these rules offered both racist public
officials and judgmental members of the African American
community itself a tool with which to punish anyone who got
caught violating marriages rules.
For a significant number of
former slaves, mostly men, legal marriage was not experienced as
a source of validation and empowerment, but as discipline and
punishment when the rigid rules of legal marriage were
transgressed, often unintentionally. Recall that in most states the
automatic marriage statutes were accompanied by a provision
requiring the freedpeople to choose one and only one spouse if the
reunion of formerly fractured families left an individual married to
more than one person. If a man, for instance, failed to make such a
selection and continued to cohabit with two women, he would be
considered married to neither, while at the same time vulnerable to
a fornication prosecution. This is exactly what happened to Sam
Means. A Georgia jury convicted him of fornication upon a
finding that Means, “a negro man, was living with two women as
his reputed wives, and had never selected either and made her his
lawful wife, as required by the [1866] act.” (Means, 1896).
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Southern judges stepped in after a period to address this
unhappy situation, and, as the following cases demonstrate, the
technical requirements of marriage laws were enforced
uncompromisingly against African Americans, regardless of
whether they were shown to have understood the details or
implications of this new regulatory regime. In Williams v. Georgia
(1881), the male defendant, whose first name is never mentioned
by the court, was shown to have been married to Elizabeth
Williams when they were both enslaved. They were separated by
their master and sold to different owners, but were reunited on
December 21, 1864, two months after General Sherman marched
to the sea. Thereafter, Elizabeth “associated immorally with
another, and the defendant quit her and married another woman.”
Since Williams had reunited with Elizabeth before March 9, 1866
(the effective date of the act legitimizing pre-existing slave
marriages) and did not “quit” her until after that date, he was
determined to have been legally married to Elizabeth when he
married his second wife. The court rejected the defendant's
argument that he did not intend his cohabitation with Elizabeth in
1866 to amount to a legal marriage. Instead the court ruled that the
1866 Act married the couple and that “[h]is wife was unfaithful; he
got mad and married again without divorce. Being a free citizen,
he must act like one, carrying the burdens, if he so considers them,
as well as enjoying the privileges of his new condition.”
Other freed men and women found themselves in legal
jeopardy when they knowingly complied with the legal
requirements pertaining to the creation of a marriage, but persisted
in the old ways by refusing to dissolve their marriages according to
the technical requirements of divorce. In 1867, Celia McConico
married David Hartwell. After two and a half years of marriage,
they “mutually agreed to separate and did then separate from each
other as husband and wife” (McConico 1873). A year later
McConico married Edom Jacobs and was thereafter prosecuted for
bigamy. At trial McConico argued that since Alabama's 1867 law
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automatically solemnized pre-existing slave marriages without
legal formalities, she assumed she was able to dissolve her
marriage without legal formality. An Alabama jury convicted her
of bigamy and the court sentenced her to two years in the state
penitentiary. Her conviction and sentence were affirmed by the
Alabama Supreme Court.
Living as marriage rights-holders was thus a complicated
matter for African Americans in the second half of the 19th
century. Marriage held out both security and danger, as they found
themselves in a new regulatory relationship with the state. These
regulations both secured their families and provided opportunity
for public officials, scorned lovers, and judgmental members of the
community8 to invoke the laws of fornication, adultery and bigamy
to discipline and punish those who transgressed the rules of
marriage. Conviction under these laws carried a heavy penalty,
usually a felony, thereby disenfranchising those men found guilty
and often subjecting them to the crushingly harsh, sometimes
deadly, convict leasing system. (Franke, 1999, pp. 305-307).
I have no evidence to suggest that public prosecutors in
New York are about to ramp up adultery prosecutions against
married gay men or lesbians who are unable to live up to their
vows of monogamy.9 But I can imagine a scenario in, say, upstate
New York where a local official who opposes the marriage rights
of same-sex couples decides to take the seldom enforced criminal
statute prohibiting adultery very seriously, and initiates a
prosecution against a married lesbian or gay man who has had sex
with someone not their legal spouse, just as we saw in the postbellum period with African Americans. After all, Dan Savage, a
prominent gay journalist and political activist, has argued in the
New York Times Magazine, to the outrage of many, that marital
infidelity is a virtue (Oppenheimer	
   2011) So too, it is not
unthinkable that a cuckolded spouse, acting out of hurt or revenge,
might find a willing partner in the local district attorney’s office.
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This is exactly the scenario that launched the prosecution in
Lawrence v. Texas, the 2006 Supreme Court case that invalidated
laws criminalizing consensual sex between two adult persons of
the same sex in private. (Carpenter 2004).10
***
Some commentators have resisted the analogy between the
civil rights movement today for lesbian and gay people and that of
African Americans in the United States. To some degree they are
no doubt right. Homophobia and racism are not equivalent forms
of social, legal and political disadvantage. Their sources and their
consequences are quite different. So too, the disadvantage and
hatred that gay and lesbian people have suffered cannot in any way
be analogized to “the badges and incidents of slavery.” Our
histories of oppression are in so many ways incommensurable.
That incommensurability does not, however, disable us
from gaining lessons from one another’s experience of oppression
and of expanded equality and freedom. For both African
Americans and gay people,11 the right to marry has figured
prominently in ongoing struggles for full rights as citizens. Given
the prominence of marriage in both public and private civil life, it
makes sense that exclusion from civil marriage has been
understood as a significant form of social disadvantage, both
materially and symbolically. Yet using marriage as the primary
container for the advancement of a community’s claims for full
equality and citizenship brings with it significant moral hazards.
Those hazards, to my mind, have not been sufficiently addressed in
today’s movement to secure marriage rights for same-sex couples.
Those hazards might be better confronted and ameliorated were we
to take seriously the lessons to be learned from the experiences of
African Americans when first able to marry in the immediate post
Civil War period. For them, as for us today, we ought to tread
carefully in securing the right to marry. Surely it is a right we
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cannot not want, but without critically engaging that desire we risk
rendering more vulnerable significant sectors of our community
who cannot or will not conform to marriage’s rules and discipline.
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1
Quoting Alfred M. Waddell, a Confederate army officer and
newspaper editor.
2
Quoting a member of the Commission that designed the North
Carolina Black Codes. See also Stampp 1956, p. 12.
3
Immediately after the war, Federal Freedmen's Bureau officers
also compiled lists of exemplary African American men who
might be appointed to various political offices in the military
governments set up by the Bureau after Congress passed the first
Reconstruction Act. See Lowe, 1993, p. 989. Lowe (1993) argues
that the “black men who, in [the Bureau's] opinion, had
demonstrated some ability and capacity for leadership in the two
years since the end of slavery,” were more than likely lightskinned. (Lowe, 1993, p. 992). Bureau agents explicitly disfavored
“black men who had already established a reputation for alienating
the native white community.” (Lowe, 1993, p. 995). Thus, Lowe
concludes, the “black leaders” listed by Bureau officers were not,
in many cases, the people whom the Black community would have
identified had they been asked. Here, as elsewhere, the freedmen
who won the praises of white military and civilian authorities
served as examples against which “bad blacks” were unfavorably
compared for refusing to play within the bounds of white
supremacy and Victorian ideology. (Lowe, 1993).
4	
  Hart’s view turned on the application of the harm principle: if no
one is harmed by the practice the state has no legitimate reason to
regulate or criminalize it. Hart, H.L.A. (1959, July 30); Devlin, P.
(1965). 	
  
5	
  Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, at 574 (2003) (citing Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851
(1992)).	
  
6
Georgia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Virginia passed
similar laws during this period. See, e.g., Act of Mar. 9, 1866, tit.
31, § 5, 1866 Ga. Laws 239, 240 (prescribing and regulating the
	
  

31	
  

	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
relation of husband and wife between persons of color); Act of
Mar. 10, 1866, ch. 40, §§ 1-5, 1866 N.C. Sess. Laws 99-101
(concerning negroes and persons of color or of mixed blood); Act
of 1865, 1865 S.C. Acts 291, 292 (establishing and regulating the
domestic relations of persons of color, and amending the law in
relation to paupers and vagrancy); Act of Feb. 27, 1865, ch. 18, §
2, 1865 Va. Acts 85 (legalizing marriages of colored persons now
cohabitating as husband and wife), in Guild, J.P., 1996, (p. 33.);
see also Howard, 1866, (p. 179) (a collection of Black Laws
assembled by the head of the Freedman's Bureau and submitted to
Congress in 1866-67).
7
Gutman (1979) describes how in some cases women who
emerged from slavery with more than one husband would choose a
legal husband based upon a number of different factors, such as the
man's wealth, or the man's willingness to provide for all of her
children, even those fathered by other men. Gutman, 1979, pp.
423-425. Litwack (1979) describes how some women chose to
reunite with their first husbands, to whom they felt a special moral
connection because their marriages had ended due to the forced
separation of the couple. Ex-slave Jane Ferguson chose to reunite
with her first husband, Martin Barnwell, even though she had
married a man named Ferguson after her master had sold away
Barnwell: “I told [Ferguson] I never 'spects Martin could come
back, but if he did he would be my husband above all others.”
8	
  	
  Often	
  bigamy	
  or	
  fornication	
  prosecutions	
  were	
  initiated	
  not	
  
by	
  racist	
  law	
  enforcement	
  officials	
  but	
  by	
  members	
  of	
  the	
  
Black	
  community	
  against	
  their	
  neighbors.	
  	
  While	
  we	
  can’t	
  
know	
  for	
  sure	
  why	
  newly	
  freed	
  people	
  turned	
  each	
  other	
  in	
  to	
  
local	
  law	
  enforcement	
  officials	
  when	
  they	
  failed	
  to	
  follow	
  the	
  
formal	
  rules	
  of	
  marriage	
  and	
  divorce,	
  we	
  can	
  supposed	
  that	
  
they	
  were	
  acting	
  to	
  get	
  even	
  for	
  other	
  slights	
  or	
  insults,	
  or	
  they	
  
were	
  concerned	
  about	
  protecting	
  the	
  reputation	
  of	
  the	
  Black	
  
community	
  more	
  generally.	
  	
  
	
  

32	
  

	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
9
Adultery remains a misdemeanor in New York State, although it
is rarely enforced. See New York State Penal Law Art. 255.17, “A
person is guilty of adultery when he engages in sexual intercourse
with another person at a time when he has a living spouse, or the
other person has a living spouse.”
10
Carpenter’s description of Lawrence and Garner’s “relationship”
is quite different from that portrayed by Kennedy’s opinion. The
two men, Lawrence white and Garner black, were not in a
relationship, but were more likely occasional sex partners. The
night of the arrest another sex partner of Garner’s called the police
to report that “a black man was going crazy” in Lawrence’s
apartment “and he was armed with a gun.” (Carpenter notes that a
racial epithet rather than “black man” was probably the term used.)
The police arrived at the apartment and found Lawrence and
Garner having sex.
11
By this phrasing I do not mean to imply that all African
Americans are heterosexual or that no gay people are African
American. Rather I am referring to the movements on behalf of
these communities that, for better or worse, tend to isolate one
aspect of identity as the animating subject of their civil rights
struggles.
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